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APPLICATIONS OF INTENTIONAL SUPPRESSION: 
THE EFFECT OF SUPPRESSION ON RECOGNITION MEMORY OF 
ECOLOGICALLY VALID STIMULI  
Rhiannon Ellis Hart, M.S. 
There are many situations in life when people try to forget information they have previously 
learned. It is therefore important to understand how to avoid negative memories. One method of 
evaluating how we actively forget, or suppress, information is to take advantage of a procedure 
known as the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm (Anderson and Green, 2001). In the TNT 
paradigm, individuals learn to associate pairs of stimuli, and must either rehearse or suppress one 
of the stimuli when presented with the other. The TNT paradigm allows for direct comparisons 
of forgetting rates of rehearsed and suppressed information. The goal of the present research was 
to consider the generalizability of the TNT paradigm. The first experiment involved the TNT 
paradigm and paired neutral words and nonverbal shapes in order to made old/new judgments 
and demonstrated that individuals are indeed capable of forgetting information using 
suppression, even when presented with the original stimuli and asked whether they have 
previously seen it, and even with nonverbal shapes as the stimuli. The procedure in Experiment 2 
was similar to that of Experiment 1, but used neutral faces and positive, neutral, or negative 
words, and results indicated that individuals can use suppression to forget powerful, ecologically 
valid stimuli – namely, faces. This effect was most driven by instances when the cue to think 
about the faces was negative. Finally, the procedure for Experiment 3 mirrored that of 
Experiment 2, except with all neutral words and faces that varied in valence. Results 
demonstrated that individuals are better able to forget negative than neutral or positive faces 
when suppressing a neutral cue. These findings constitute a first step in a fundamentally 
advancing our understanding of real life forgetting experiences. The ability to forget information 
in difficult situations generalizes previous findings to more everyday situations. The fact that we 
can suppress faces implies we might be able to use suppression in real situations involving 
people of negative personal significance. Contrary to previous valence research, negative 
information was easier to suppress than neutral or positive information. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout life, information becomes irrelevant, facts become discredited, and news becomes 
old. Sometimes we experience events that we would rather not think about, or situations that we 
know will unduly bias us. In circumstances like these, forgetting, the failure of memory that we 
often seek to escape, becomes our greatest virtue. We use our ability to forget information to 
update our knowledge, avoid distraction or rumination, and make objective decisions. Given the 
importance of forgetting, understanding how we might accomplish this forgetting is crucial to 
controlling and better utilizing our thoughts, decisions, and actions. 
A new method for studying intentional memory inhibition is the think/no-think paradigm. 
In the following section, I will discuss what the think/no-think paradigm is and how it has been 
used to evaluate how individuals forget information in real life situations. I will consider current 
applications of this procedure. Finally, I will address how we might broaden the generalizability 
of the application of the think/no-think paradigm. 
1.1 THINK/NO-THINK PARADIGM 
Research has shown for decades that deliberate efforts to forget previously learned material can 
cause forgetting (e.g., Deese, 1965). More recently, a new paradigm has emerged called the 
think/no-think paradigm (TNT paradigm) that involves learning paired associates and later 
rehearsing or suppressing certain pairs (Anderson and Green, 2001). The TNT paradigm has 
provided evidence that merely trying not to think about (suppressing) information can reduce 
subsequent recall ability.  
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1.1.1 Procedure for the TNT paradigm 
The basic procedure of the TNT paradigm involves three phases. First, participants study paired 
associates to a learning threshold. In the original version of this paradigm, both members of the 
paired associates were words. These pairs consisted of a cue word and a response word. 
Following the learning phase, participants viewed the cue word. For some cue words, 
participants are instructed to think about (rehearse) the associated response word. For others, 
they are instructed to avoid thinking about (suppress) the response word. Still other cue words 
are not presented at all during this think/no-think phase (TNT phase). Finally, in the test phase of 
the TNT paradigm, participants are given a memory test in which they are asked to recall all of 
the response words that they can. Results of this paradigm have revealed that, often even after 
only suppressing once, individuals are less able to recall suppressed word pairs than rehearsed 
word pairs. Further, with increasing numbers of TNT phase suppression trials, participants tend 
to lose even more of their ability to recall information (Anderson and Green, 2001)1. 
1.1.2 Implications of the TNT paradigm 
Before discussing the applications others have made regarding the TNT paradigm, it is necessary 
to delineate what is meant by decreased memory performance when comparing suppressed 
stimuli to rehearsed stimuli, as well as what is meant by decreased memory performance when 
comparing suppressed stimuli to neither rehearsed nor suppressed stimuli. When we consider the 
difference between suppressed and rehearsed stimuli, we are comparing memory abilities in two 
situations where individuals are faced with cues that trigger a memory. In the former, individuals 
would avoid thinking about the memory associated with the cue. An individual in this situation 
might be trying to avoid thinking about an argument with a coworker who they see daily. In the 
                                                 
1 While the overall effects of suppression described by Anderson demonstrated that increased suppression 
caused increased inhibition, this finding was not consistent across studies, even in the original paper. Whereas 
Experiment 1 and an averaging of Experiments 1 through 3 showed inhibition at the eight repetitions level, 
Experiments 2 and 3 did not show consistent inhibition for suppression with less than 16 repetitions. Suppression of 
eight repetitions appears to sometimes have the same effect as not having been exposed to a cue at all. While 
significant, this is not the same as saying that suppression reliably causes inhibition. 
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latter, an individual would attempt to think about the memory associated with the cue. An 
individual in this situation might try to think about a happy conversation with a coworker they 
see daily.  
A comparison between stimuli that have been suppressed and those that were neither 
suppressed nor rehearsed, however, is comparing a situation where there is a cue to a memory 
that an individual wishes to avoid thinking about, compared to a situation in which there is no 
cue to think about the memory. This may involve trying to avoid thinking about an argument 
with a coworker that an individual sees daily, as opposed to an argument with someone that the 
individual does not see at all. This comparison, then, contrasts memory ability after actively 
attempting to not think about a target in the face of cues to memory ability after a lack of cues. 
1.1.2.1 Paradigms contributing to the think/no-think paradigm 
The idea that individuals might be able to exclude information from coming to mind has been 
considered previously by procedures reviewed below. When considering intentional suppression, 
we can borrow from the research of two related procedures: the list method of intentional 
forgetting2, and retrieval-induced forgetting. Though they differ from each other and the TNT 
paradigm in methodology and results, each of these methods has added to our understanding of 
how individuals can control their thoughts and affect the accessibility of their memories. 
(a) Intentional forgetting 
In the list method of intentional forgetting, participants are given two lists of words to memorize; 
then they are tested to a certain criterion level of accuracy. Before the presentation of the second 
list, however, participants in the Forget condition are told that they do not need to remember the 
first list. Participants in the Remember condition are not told to disregard the first list (Muther, 
1965). 
Results from intentional forgetting research have illustrated that when given a later 
memory test, participants in the Forget condition are less able to remember the information from 
                                                 
2 There is another method for testing intentional forgetting: the item method. However, this method is not 
clearly a procedure demonstrating forgetting of encoded information, and is instead seen as differential encoding. 
Thus, it is not included in this discussion. 
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the first list than participants in the Remember condition. That is, they are less able to remember 
the information that they were told they did not need to remember (the to-be-forgotten 
information) than participants who were instructed to remember both lists. Conversely, they are 
better able to remember the information that they were told to remember (the to-be-remembered 
information) than participants who were told to remember both lists (Whetstone, Cross, and 
Whetstone, 1996).  
(b) Retrieval-induced forgetting 
Retrieval-induced forgetting investigates how successfully recalling an item from memory can 
affect the accessibility of the other items. In retrieval-induced forgetting research, participants 
learn a list of items from multiple categories. For instance, GREEN items include lime, grass, 
etc. RED items include blood, tomato, etc. After learning all information to equivalent 
performance levels, target information from some categories is rehearsed while other information 
is not rehearsed. Additionally, some categories have no information rehearsed. For instance, the 
participant might rehearse blood from the RED list, but nothing from the GREEN list. Then, 
participants attempt to remember all of the information they initially learned. Research 
demonstrates that if an individual has practiced the item blood, their memory for the word 
tomato is inhibited. This does not affect the accessibility of members of the GREEN category, 
however, as they did not need to be inhibited in order to aid in the memory success of blood. 
This effect has been hypothesized to be due to suppression of unrehearsed items (Anderson and 
Bell, 2001).  
1.1.3 Factors in generalizing of the TNT paradigm 
The results of studies using the TNT paradigm are cited as evidence that suppression is a 
controlled process used to inhibit familiarity, a measure of automatic activation of memory, 
especially active when explicit memory fails (Hedden and Park, 2003; Windmann, Urbach, and 
Kutas, 2002). Other researchers have applied the TNT paradigm to real life forgetting, claiming 
that the TNT paradigm shows how individuals can forget ecologically valid information such as 
emotional memories (Smith, Gleaves, and Pierce, 2003). Still others have gone farther, claiming 
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that the TNT paradigm is evidence of the existence of Freudian Repression, specifically tying 
this paradigm to issues such as traumatic memories (Conway, 2001; Schacter, 2001). 
In order to connect the TNT paradigm to such real-life situations, it is necessary to 
establish the generalizability of the initial suppression findings reported by Anderson and Green 
(2001). The present research specifically concerns three main questions: First, how extensive is 
the forgetting that is seen in the TNT paradigm in the face of powerful contextual cues? If we 
know that memory impairment is demonstrated using recall tests, can we also produce 
impairment using memory tests that offer more salient cues, such as those offered in a 
recognition test? Second, can the forgetting that we see using words be generated when we use 
more powerful stimuli, such as nonverbalizable shapes or faces? The use of faces specifically 
offers us the chance to consider the possibility of forgetting people using this paradigm. Finally, 
is forgetting possible with stimuli of varying valence? If so, what are the factors that affect 
memory specifically? For instance, is the fact that the stimuli are emotional enough to change 
how easily they can be forgotten, or does the direction of the valence matter? While the TNT 
paradigm has not yet considered these questions, intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced 
forgetting have made inroads into generalizing memory findings in these areas.  
1.1.3.1 Cues to remember 
When individuals fail to remember information, this can be due to multiple causes. If the 
individual was unable to remember information on a free recall test, it may be that there were not 
enough contextual cues available for them to access subthreshold memories. By contrast, 
recognition memory tests, when presented with the stimulus used at learning, often decreases 
possible forgetting. This may be due to an inability in free recall to access more powerful cues 
observed in the presented target item. Testing memory by asking whether something was learned 
before is an extremely powerful cue, in that it provides a great deal of information to trigger 
memory. The use of recognition tests in measuring accessibility speaks to a lowered threshold 
for retrieving information that might be available, given enough cues (e.g., Cohen and Nodine, 
1978). There may be situations in which information is still present in memory, but free recall 
will fail to provide enough of a cue to access it. The use of recognition tests allows for additional 
cues to access that information. Accordingly, a lack of accessibility on a recognition test is a 
stronger indicator of forgetting than a lack of accessibility on a recall test. 
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Additionally, the use of recognition tests reduces interference from irrelevant information 
(Wallace and Page, 1982). By contrast, when recalling information, it may be difficult to select 
out only the information that is wanted and not all information that is available. Some 
information may be made more accessible through semantic priming (Collins and Loftus, 1975). 
Other information may be more accessible due to episodic priming, such as having been encoded 
at the same time or under similar circumstances (Hayes and Bissett, 1998). Clearly, there is inter- 
and intra-item interference evident in recall tests, but recognition tests tend to be more immune 
to these effects, due to the restricted nature of the test. 
Some intentional forgetting research has shown memory deficits using both recall (Fleck, 
Berch, and Shear, 2001; Sahakyan, 2004) and recognition (Tekcan and Aktürk, 2001) 
techniques, while other research has shown that recognition serves to ameliorate the inhibitory 
effects seen with free recall (Basden and Basden, 1998). There have been numerous studies 
involving retrieval-induced forgetting showing memory impairment through both recall 
(Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork, 1994; Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork, 2000) and recognition tests 
(Hicks and Starns, 2004; Veling and van Knippenberg, 2004). Within the realm of the TNT 
paradigm, however, the only research that has previously been conducted has used recall as the 
dependent measure, instead of recognition. 
1.1.3.2 Stimuli types 
There are many types of information that individuals might try to forget. While there may be 
situations in which individuals try to forget words, it is important to understand what restrictions 
there are on the ability to forget information through suppression. While there are times when 
individuals may want to forget words (such as learned facts or passwords), there are many other 
situations as well that may be candidates for suppression. In some cases, individuals may want to 
avoid thinking about experiences that are difficult to put into words (such as experiences that are 
emotionally troubling, though it is hard to explain why). In others, individuals may try not to 
think about specific people with whom they have had negative experiences. In each of these 
situations, it is necessary to extend our understanding of the reach of forgetting effects from 
suppression. Specifically, are individuals able to forget more complex and powerful stimuli, such 
as nonverbalizable shapes and faces, as well as they forget words? 
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Many researchers have shown that intentional forgetting of words impairs memory 
(Woodward and Bjork, 1971). These findings of inhibition of memory have also been extended 
to pictures (Bjork and Bjork, 2003; Foster and Gavelek, 1983; Lehman, Morath, and Franklin, 
1998). Various experiments have also demonstrated greater forgetting for nonpracticed same-
category items with word lists (Smith and Hunt, 2000), pictures (Ford, Keating, and Patel, 2004; 
Shaw, Bjork, and Handal, 1995), locations (Ciranni and Shimamura, 1999), and oral stories 
(Bylin and Christianson, 2002). Thus, all of these procedures have shown at least some 
impairment on memory with varying types of stimuli.  
When considering the strength and persistence of the forgetting found in the TNT 
paradigm, it is unclear whether the suppression-related forgetting extends to stimuli other than 
words. It may be that visual or auditory information will add a level of salience to the paradigm, 
releasing the inhibition that is caused by short-term suppression. For instance, the memory of the 
words of an old school book may not be enough of a trigger to remember that the book was 
stored in the attic, but the smell of dust may be an adequate trigger. If we find that the TNT 
paradigm does not cause inhibitory memory effects with nonlexical stimuli, then the TNT 
paradigm may not be the most realistic explanation for why individuals forget information in 
life. While much of what we experience in life involves words, there are situations in which our 
experiences are more abstract or nonverbalizable in nature. On the other hand, if individuals still 
experience inhibition with nonlexical stimuli, then the TNT paradigm remains a viable account 
for real life forgetting. 
1.1.3.3 Valence 
When individuals attempt to suppress information, the motivation (avoiding thinking about a 
target) implies that there is something negative about the outcome of what would happen if the 
individual did think about the target. While in some cases, this negative outcome may not be 
based on the emotional nature of the target (for instance, sometimes thinking about neutral or 
positive things can be a distraction), there are clearly many times when individuals will want to 
avoid thinking about negative experiences as well. Suppression results in forgetting of neutral 
stimuli, as has been demonstrated in the past, but to truly understand possible applications and 
limitations of the TNT paradigm, we must consider stimuli that are either positive or negative. In 
so doing, we are better able to conceive of the scope of the forgetting effects of suppression. 
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When tested with positive and negative words in an intentional forgetting paradigm, 
participants forget both positive and negative words. There are, however, higher forgetting rates 
for positive words than negative words (McNally, Clancy, and Barrett, 2004). Other research has 
demonstrated that participants identified as “repressors” (those reporting having previously 
repressed experiences) were more likely to forget negative information than nonrepressors in an 
intentional forgetting study (Myers, Brewin, and Power, 1998). In both of these studies, as in 
many like them, only positive and negative stimuli are considered; neutral stimuli are not 
included. Participants in retrieval-induced forgetting research also demonstrate forgetting of 
nonpracticed items, irrespective of valence, though to differing degrees. Nonpracticed memories 
of all valence types are inhibited, compared to competing practiced memories, though the most 
forgetting is evidenced in positive and negative memories respectively (Barnier, Hung, and 
Conway, 2004). For personally relevant information, however, participants with General Anxiety 
Disorder do not produce the same findings for negative stimuli, though they did for neutral and 
positive stimuli (Amir, Coles, Brigidi, and Foa, 2001).  
1.2 PRESENT CONCERNS 
The present research addresses the generalizability of the TNT paradigm and the efficacy of 
suppression, given three variables. First, is forgetting possible through a recognition test, even 
given salient contextual cues? Second, is forgetting possible for stimuli that are likely to be seen 
in real life situations, such as the memory of faces? Finally, does valence of stimuli have an 
effect on forgetting success?  
1.2.1 Recognition tests 
Research into the TNT paradigm has thus far been limited to recall tests of memory – both same 
cue and independent cue recall tests. While each of these tests is important, evidencing that 
forgetting is induced in episodic memory and priming is inhibited due to intentional suppression 
respectively, what is still unclear is whether that same inhibition would remain in the face of 
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extremely salient cues. Would individuals still forget, even when presented with the most salient 
cue possible, the target itself, in a recognition test? Would, on the other hand, the substantial 
level of cuing provided by a recognition test demonstrate that the forgetting seen in previous 
research does not extend to recognition memory tests?   
All three experiments test memory performance through recognition tests. During the 
final test phase of Experiment 1, with shapes, and Experiments 2 and 3, with faces, participants 
are presented with the target stimuli (the shapes/faces that were rehearsed or suppressed) and 
asked to identify whether they had learned that shape/face before. If suppression is successful at 
a fundamental level, participants would be expected to forget more suppressed than rehearsed 
stimuli. 
1.2.2 Types of stimuli 
Previous research using the TNT paradigm has involved words as stimuli. In order to validate the 
TNT paradigm as a reasonable method of forgetting of other information types, it is necessary to 
know if this research can generalize to more complex stimuli types. If the TNT paradigm only 
works with words, this might serve to limit its applicability to situations in which it could be 
utilized. Previous research has shown that the TNT paradigm is effective for lexical information, 
but what about visual information in the absence of lexical information? Likewise, we must 
consider stimuli that we are likely to encounter in real life such as faces of new individuals. 
Experiment 1 considers visual stimuli that are nonverbalizable, in this case, shapes that 
are designed to be difficult to describe. This way, they cannot be associated with words in one’s 
lexicon. This adds to the generalizability of the TNT paradigm in that it does not solely rely on a 
person’s memory of a word (i.e., lexical information). When one encounters a novel situation 
that is not lexical in nature, can the use of intentional suppression as demonstrated in the TNT 
paradigm reduce the accessibility of that memory? 
Experiments 2 and 3 consider stimuli that are faces. Faces are nonverbalizable and are 
more commonly encountered in real life than nonverbalizable shapes. When using faces as our 
stimuli, we can begin to consider whether it is possible to suppress information about those we 
encounter. In addition, faces appear to have numerous special properties. Neuroimaging research 
into the fusiform gyrus has demonstrated that faces are recognized differently than other objects 
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(George, Dolan, Fink, Baylis, Russell, and Driver, 1999; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, and Allison, 
1997). Research into processing of facial features shows that individuals process faces in a 
holistic fashion, rather than based on a modular deconstruction of features (Gauthier, Curran, 
Curby, and Collins, 2003; Pellicano and Rhodes, 2003). Thus, whether individuals are able to 
forget faces extends substantially the importance of suppression utilized by the TNT paradigm 
by proving that forgetting is possible even with stimuli requiring special processing. 
1.2.3 Valence of stimuli 
Another issue that is central to the generalizability of the TNT paradigm is the fact that not all 
stimuli that individuals want to suppress are neutral. Whether something is positive, neutral, or 
negative may have some degree of effect on how well individuals are able to suppress 
information, whether due to motivation, experience, or something else entirely. This seems 
especially likely, given that findings in the other discussed paradigms have tended to show such 
differential memory effects. 
Experiment 2 includes cues words that are positive, neutral, and negative. Thus, while the 
faces paired with the words are neutral, the words used to cue the faces vary in valence. When 
exposed to words that are positive or negative, the emotional nature of the word may affect the 
ability to suppress the face. This difference may be due to an inability to engage in more 
complex executive control processes due to the emotional nature of the cue. Specifically, it may 
be too difficult to disengage from the cue in time to prevent thoughts of the target from entering 
the mind. On the other hand, the valence of the word may provide enough contextual cues 
associated with past experiences of successfully intentionally suppressing for accurate memory. 
It may be that individuals will be most successful suppressing information that they have the 
most experience suppressing, and certainly negative information is what individuals generally 
have the most motivation to forget. 
Experiment 3 includes neutral words cuing faces that are positive (e.g., happy), neutral, 
or negative (e.g., sad, angry). Instead of the immediately presented information being positive, 
neutral, or negative, the associated face is positive, neutral, or negative. This experiment most 
closely generalizes to real situations where individuals might attempt to intentionally suppress 
memories of negative experiences with another individual. 
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2.0  EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 considers two related issues bearing on the generalizability of the TNT paradigm: 
First, the stimuli used are shapes instead of words. If suppression of shapes is successful, it 
means that information that can be suppressed in the TNT paradigm need not be lexical. That is, 
this paradigm is not limited to a laboratory setting wherein participants are learning and 
suppressing word lists, but instead can be applied to other sorts of learned information as well. 
Second, the stimuli used are nonverbalizable. This manipulation eliminates the confounding 
variable that the shapes are visual, but encoded lexically anyway. 
If the TNT paradigm were indeed to serve as a possible model for the forgetting of more 
significant experiences, one of the critical issues is to assess the potency of the forgetting. Some 
critics of the applicability of the TNT paradigm to the topic of traumatic forgetting have noted 
that the forgetting in this paradigm is relatively modest as indicated by the sheer number of items 
that are forgotten (Garry and Loftus, 2004). However there are two ways of assessing the 
magnitude of forgetting. One is to measure the degree to which suppression increases the 
proportion of items that are not retrieved. Another is to ask how difficult it is to retrieve those 
items whose accessibility has been altered by suppression. It seems quite plausible that while the 
TNT paradigm may only produce forgetting for some items, when such forgetting does occur, it 
may occur in a relatively robust manner. Such an observation would potentially be consistent 
with forgetting of trauma, in the sense that these memories are often well remembered 
(suggesting that suppression is often ineffective), but are at least occasionally reported to have 
been completely forgotten. This suggests that when suppression takes effect, it may be relatively 
complete (Williams, 1995).  
One of the critical questions necessary for assessing the potency of the forgetting of those 
items whose accessibility is reduced through suppression is determining whether the forgetting 
persists in the presence of additional contextual cues. In several forgetting paradigms it has been 
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observed that reductions of accessibility are relatively fragile, such that items that are not 
accessible with free recall become accessible with recognition (Basden and Basden, 1998). If the 
forgetting associated with the TNT paradigm is such that it cannot be maintained in the face of 
the additional contextual cues associated with recognition, its applicability to other types of 
forgetting is clearly quite questionable. For instance, the application of this research to situations 
in which people are queried specifically about their experiences would not be appropriate.  
On the other hand, it is possible that even if the TNT paradigm did not generalize to a 
recognition paradigm, it still might potentially have some relevance to the forgetting of traumatic 
material. The absence of recollection of a traumatic memory could be the result of a failure to 
encounter the specific contextual cues that would prompt activation of the memory. 
Nevertheless, if the TNT paradigm reduces forgetting to the extent that it persists even when 
participants are directly confronted with the previously studied item, then this would suggest that 
it induces a relatively robust form of forgetting and thereby bringing us one (albeit modest) step 
closer to the claim that the TNT paradigm may provide a basis for more profound varieties of 
forgetting. 
2.1 METHODS 
2.1.1 Participants and design 
 Forty-nine introductory psychology students from the University of Pittsburgh 
participated in this 3 (not presented, presented once, or presented eight times in phase two) x 2 
(rehearsed or suppressed) within-participants experiment. 
2.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Fifty words were paired with 50 nonverbalizable shapes and were used as studied items. Eighty-
three additional nonverbalizable shapes were used as fillers. Shapes were designed to be 
specifically hard to verbalize, and obtained using guidelines set by Attneave and Arnoult’s 
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Method I for the construction of nonverbalizable shapes (1957). The words used were concrete, 
high-frequency nouns. They were selected from Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; 
Bradley and Lang, 1999). 
 During the initial phase of the study, the List Learn phase, participants were 
shown each word and shape pair side-by-side on a computer screen for four seconds. Participants 
were given instructions to memorize the pairs for a later test. They were additionally instructed 
not to attempt to verbalize the shapes presented. This was to assure that participants did not 
attempt to think of the shapes as words. Following the single presentation of each word-shape 
pair, participants were tested on their ability to recognize the shape that had been paired with a 
given word. This was accomplished by presenting the word on the screen for three seconds. 
Below the word, four shapes were shown, one of which was the shape paired with the word. 
Participants were asked to select the key on the keyboard that corresponded to the correct shape 
before the three seconds had elapsed. Following the presentation of the word and shapes, the 
correct shape was shown, and the test continued to the next item. Participants continued to be 
tested until they achieved 50% accuracy. All participants achieved at least 50% accuracy by the 
third presentation cycle.  
Participants then began the second phase, the think/no-think phase (TNT phase). Here, 
participants were required to either rehearse or suppress word-shape pairs in a manner similar to 
the previous phase. However, they were cued as to whether they should rehearse or suppress 
based on the color of the fixation cross and word that immediately followed it. For pairs that 
were to be rehearsed, the method was the same as in the List Learn phase. Pairs that were to be 
rehearsed were presented in green following a green fixation cross. The word was presented at 
the center of the screen, and four shape options were shown at the bottom. Participants were 
instructed to identify the shape that matched the word on the center of the screen and key the 
correct response on the keyboard. Following this presentation, the correct answer was shown. 
For items that were to be suppressed, the method was slightly different. The word was 
presented in red following a red fixation cross. Instead of seeing four possible shapes, 
participants were presented with four empty boxes at the bottom of the screen. They were 
instructed not to respond to the word in this situation, and instead to avoid thinking about the 
related shape. In the suppress trials, participants were not provided with the correct response. All 
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pairs were presented zero, one, or eight times3. Each pair that was presented was categorized as 
either rehearse, suppress, or never shown. Some pairs were rehearsed once, some were rehearsed 
eight times. Other pairs were suppressed once, whereas others were suppressed eight times. Still 
others were not presented in this phase at all, and so were neither rehearsed nor suppressed 
(NRS).  
Following a filler activity, participants entered the Final Test phase. Participants were 
presented with 100 shapes. Of those 100 shapes, 50 were members of the word-shape pairs and 
50 were shapes that were never paired with a word. For each shape, participants were asked 
whether they had previously seen it paired with a word. Shapes were presented one at a time, and 
stayed on the screen until participants made old/new judgments. After the presentation of all 100 
shapes, participants were debriefed.  
2.2 RESULTS 
2.2.1 Overall recognition accuracy 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) examining accuracy of old/new judgments showed significant 
differences between conditions for action during TNT phase (rehearse, suppress, or NRS), 
number of repetitions, and interaction, F (2, 96) = 65.561, p < .001, F (1, 48) = 20.852, p < .001, 
and F (2, 96) = 4.708, p = .011, respectively. 
Overall, shapes that were rehearsed were more likely to be correctly identified as “old” 
than shapes that were suppressed, t (48) = 11.507, p < .001. Indeed, shapes that were suppressed 
appeared to attain no more than roughly 50% accuracy in participants’ identification of them as 
old, t (48) = 3.412, p > .05. While there was no difference between shapes that were suppressed 
once and suppressed eight times, t < 1, shapes that were rehearsed eight times were significantly 
more likely to be judged as old than shapes that were rehearsed only once, t (48) = 6.423, p < 
                                                 
3 While 16 repetitions would have been preferable, it was not feasible, given time and participant 
constrictions. After careful consideration, it was determined that eight repetitions did show a meaningful enough 
effect to use. 
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.001. There was a significant difference between NRS shapes and all other conditions. That is, 
NRS shapes were significantly more likely to be identified as old than shapes that were 
suppressed at least once, S1: t (48) = 9.108, p = .004; S8: t (48) = 10.789, p = .002, and 
significantly less likely to be identified as old than shapes that were rehearsed at least once, R1: t 
(48) = 5.981, p = .018; R8: t (48) = 79.369, p < .001. When participants suppressed shapes, they 
were less accurate than when they were simply not exposed to cues at all during the TNT phase. 
Finally, NRS items were significantly more accurately remembered than chance (p > .10). (See 
Figure 1.) 
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Figure 1. Percent of trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition in 
Experiment 1. 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
This study makes two points: First, when presented with nonverbalizable stimuli, participants are 
less accurate and slower when they suppress the associations they learned as compared to when 
they do not suppress. This result appears to demonstrate that the previous research findings 
regarding the inhibitory effects of the TNT paradigm do transfer to nonlexical stimuli. While this 
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does not mean that shapes (the current stimuli) and words (the previous stimuli) are treated the 
same in memory, it is indicative that intentional thought suppression does indeed work for a 
variety of stimuli and is not simply a method of suppressing words from immediate awareness. 
Second, when participants were asked whether they had previously seen the stimuli, they were 
less accurate in their abilities to correctly recognize old items after suppressing the stimuli as 
compared to when they did not suppress. This is consistent with the pattern of results seen in 
recall memory TNT research, and extends those findings. This indicates that even though the 
information is easier to access given memory cues, there is the potential for information to be 
inaccessible, even in the face of direct cuing. 
These findings are similar to previous research (Anderson and Green, 2001) in that 
rehearsed items remained better remembered than suppressed or NRS items, and suppressed 
items were less well remembered than rehearsed or NRS items. This implies that, even in the 
face of direct cuing, the use of suppression does cause inhibition in memory, as measured by 
recognition. While there was no direct evidence that the additional suppression attempts results 
in inhibition, the present research did not include as many suppression attempts as previous 
research has. If participants had suppressed up to 16 times, it is possible that the increased 
number of suppressions would have a greater inhibitory effect on memory. Indeed, the difference 
between one and eight suppression attempts has not consistently been shown to result in 
increased inhibition, as is especially evident in independent cue recall tests (Anderson and 
Green, 2001). On the other hand, increased suppression does not inevitably lead to increased 
inhibition. Ciranni and Shimamura (1999) found through their retrieval-induced forgetting 
experiment that, even after having participants rehearse target information multiple times, 
inhibitory effects for nontarget competitors did not increase beyond the effect of minimal 
retrieval. Thus, given the similarity between the TNT paradigm and the retrieval-induced 
forgetting procedure, we can extrapolate that it is not necessarily the case that increased 
presentations will lead to greater impairment. 
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3.0  EXPERIMENT 2 
It is now clear that suppression leads to forgetting, even in the face of salient retrieval cues, as 
well as when using visual stimuli. A next step in considering the generalizability of the TNT is to 
look at the ability to forget more ecologically valid stimuli. While we encounter words often 
enough in our lives, we are social creatures and regularly encounter people whose faces we must 
process. Invariably, not all of our social interactions will be positive, and in order for us to 
successfully suppress memories of negative social interactions, we must have some method of 
avoiding thinking about those individuals involved. It is therefore important to consider the 
ability to suppress stimuli such as faces.  
Faces are unique in the way that we process them. They are considered difficult to 
verbalize, and attempts to do so can worsen our abilities to remember faces accurately later 
(Fallshore and Schooler, 1995). Additionally, faces are encountered so regularly that we are 
specifically attuned to pay them special attention. Across species, special neural processing 
systems have been specifically dedicated to the processing of faces and expressions (Bruce and 
Young, 1986). 
Additionally, in considering how we remember, we must note that not all cues are 
positive. Sometimes the cue causing us to think about a certain individual is negative (for 
instance, seeing a scary dog might cause a child to think of when they were once bitten), or 
positive (for instance, seeing happy children playing may cause a grieving parent to think about a 
deceased child). Valence of the cue is therefore also relevant. There is often a difference in the 
abilities of individuals to remember or forget information in intentional forgetting and retrieval-
induced forgetting research, based on valence of the stimuli. Individuals are able to forget 
information in retrieval-induced forgetting paradigms, though the research equivocates on 
whether it is easier to forget positive (Amir et al., 2001) or negative information (Barnier et al., 
2004). Repressors (individuals who reported having previously repressed a memory) are more 
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likely to forget negative information than nonrepressors in intentional forgetting research 
(Myers, et al., 1998). What is not evident is the effect of the valence of the cue on the efficacy of 
suppression. There are times when the information that is being rehearsed or suppressed may be 
accessed by an emotional cue. One such situation might be the experience of scenes about sexual 
abuse in a movie bringing about memories of having experienced abuse (Schooler, Ambadar, 
and Bendiksen, 1997).  
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to evaluate the effect of more ecologically valid stimuli, 
as well as varying the valence of cue information. Instead of using words or shapes, we use faces 
as the target that participants are to remember or forget in the TNT phase. Experiment 2 
additionally includes manipulations of the valence of the cuing stimuli. Cue information in 
Experiment 2 is positive, neutral, or negative, paired with a neutral target face. This allows for an 
examination of memory ability across a range of potential emotional (or unemotional) cues. 
Experiment 2 therefore adds to the generalizability of the suppression in the TNT paradigm, 
making is more akin to realistic social situations with an added depth of complexity of both the 
targets and cues.  
3.1 METHODS 
3.1.1 Participants and design 
Sixty-seven University of Pittsburgh and Fairfield University students participated in this 
3 (not presented, presented once, or presented eight times in phase two) x 2 (rehearsed or 
suppressed) x 3 (positive, neutral, or negative word) within-participants experiment.  
3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
First, participants learned to pair 60 words (20 positive, 20 negative, and 20 neutral) and 60 
faces. As in Experiment 1, cue words were selected from the ANEW list (Bradley and Lang, 
1999). The faces were designed using the facial composite program, FACES 3.0. Both targets 
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and foils were equally likely to be male or female and African-American or Caucasian. Targets 
and foils shared similar features, though each face was unique and no feature was used more than 
four times. There were also 60 additional faces used as foils in the final test, as well as 60 
distracter faces. Participants were presented with a word paired with a face. As in Experiment 1, 
participants were trained to 50% accuracy on the associations. Then they rehearsed and 
suppressed zero, one, or eight times. Finally, participants were given a recognition test on 120 
faces in order to make old/new judgments. 
3.2 RESULTS 
3.2.1 Recognition accuracy: Condition. 
An ANOVA considering accuracy of old/new judgments showed significant differences between 
conditions for action during TNT phase and an interaction, F (2, 198) = 25.437, p < .001 and F 
(2, 198) = 37.574, p < .001, respectively. 
Overall, rehearsed faces were more likely to be correctly identified as “old” than 
suppressed or NRS faces, t (66) = 7.243, p < .001 and t (66) = 5.634, p < .001, respectively. 
Thus, rehearsal caused greater accuracy overall. There was a significant difference between R8 
and S8 faces as well as a significant difference between R1 and S1 faces, t (66) = 11.009, p < 
.001 and t (66) = 2.013, p < .046, respectively. In addition to this, there was a significant 
difference between R1 faces and NRS faces, t (66) = 2.411, p = .017. This demonstrates that the 
overall inhibitory effect of suppression is driven by increased repetitions. Additionally, there was 
a significant difference between R1 and R8 faces, t (66) = 6.333, p < .001, as well as S1 and S8 
faces, t (66) = 2.827, p = .005, furthering the previous importance of repetition. Thus, 
suppression did cause inhibition, increasing with the number of repetitions. Finally, participants 
were significantly more accurate than chance in recognizing NRS items, t (66) = 62.097, p < 
.001. (See Figure 2.) 
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Figure 2. Percent of trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition in 
Experiment 2. 
3.2.2 Recognition accuracy: Valence of cue word 
An ANOVA of the effect of the valence of the face on accurate recognition showed a main effect 
for valence, as well as an interaction between valence and condition, F (2, 198) = 5.966, p = .003 
and F (4, 396) = 4.678, p < .001, respectively.  
When considering the effect of valence of the word on accuracy, participants were more 
accurate with positive words than with neutral words, t (66) = 3.494, p < .001. The pattern of 
inhibition changed based on whether the face was positive, neutral, or negative. When the word 
was positive, rehearsed faces were more accurately identified than either suppressed or NRS 
faces, t (66) = 5.960, p < .001 and t (66) = 7.114, p < .001, respectively, and suppressed faces 
were more accurately remembered than NRS faces, t (66) = 2.043, p = 044. Thus, when reacting 
to a positive cue, recognition was best when the cue was rehearsed, followed by suppressed, and 
least effective when not rehearsed or suppressed.  
When the word was neutral, rehearsed items were more accurately identified than either 
suppressed or NRS faces, t (66) = 4.171, p < .001 and t (66) = 4.043, p < .001, respectively. 
There was no significant difference between suppressed and NRS faces, t < 1. Thus, when 
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reacting to a neutral word, rehearsal was the most beneficial, followed equally by NRS and 
suppressed faces. 
Finally, when the word was negative, rehearsed faces were more accurately identified 
than either suppressed or NRS items, t (66) = 7.072, p < .001 and t (66) = 2.528, p < .013, 
respectively, and NRS faces were more accurately remembered than suppressed faces, t (66) = 
3.779, p < .001. Additionally, all NRS faces were more accurately recognized than at a chance 
level, t (66) = 5.726, p < .001. Therefore, when reacting to a negative word, rehearsal was the 
most beneficial, followed by NRS, and then suppressed faces. (See Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3. Percent trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition and 
valence of word in Experiment 2. 
3.3 DISCUSSION 
Individuals successfully suppressed faces in a similar manner to words or nonverbalizable shapes 
in certain situations, adding to the applicability of the TNT paradigm as a model of suppression 
that individuals might employ in everyday situations. There may be many times when 
individuals do not want to remember faces of individuals. That they can forget faces due to 
suppression in this experimental setting is an important step in understanding how individuals 
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deal with encountering others with whom they have negative associations. Despite overall 
success, however, the forgetting demonstrated was mitigated by valence. Not all cue valences 
were equal in their forgetting effects: successful forgetting was only seen consistently with 
negative cue words.  
It is also important to consider that this experiment did not completely replicate the 
original findings of Anderson and Green (2001). There was not an overall inhibitory effect of 
items that were suppressed once as compared to NRS items. Likewise, in the condition that was 
most similar to Anderson and Green’s research – the neutral condition – there was no significant 
difference between suppressed and NRS items. Thus, while we can conclude from these results 
that the original inhibitory findings do replicate in some conditions, including when we average 
all data, we cannot say with certainty that the results will always replicate, or that they are 
consistent across all conditions. Clearly, we need to more closely consider the conditions under 
which suppression will induce inhibition and when it will not. 
Further, in the real world, there are often situations in which the cues for the information 
we want to forget are not neutral. It is therefore important to consider how individuals respond to 
trying to suppress when the cues that cause them to remember information are emotional, a 
research area that thus far appears to be lacking. The results of this experiment suggest that when 
a cue is positive or neutral, forgetting of suppressed items was not as great as NRS items. That is, 
suppressed items were remembered significantly better than NRS items, but not as well as 
rehearsed items. While this finding is similar to previous research (Anderson and Green, 2001), 
this finding does not demonstrate the increased inhibitory finding for suppressed items over NRS 
items that is commonly discussed. When the cue was negative, however, items that were 
suppressed were less accessible than even items that were never shown during the second phase. 
That is, suppressed items were recognized less often than NRS items. The finding involving 
negative cues was more in line with the previous TNT results. 
There are a number of possible causes of the negative cue pattern of results. One potential 
explanation is that individuals may simply be more experienced at suppressing cues to 
information when those cues are negative. Individuals with negative experiences are not always 
likely to have those memories cued by positive or even neutral cues. In many cases, they are 
much more likely instead to think about a memory they are trying to avoid by a negative cue. 
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This is especially true in a situation that would mirror a recognition memory test, where the cue 
to think about a target is the target itself (or something similar).  
Another possibility is that positive or neutral cue information is easier to stop attending to 
than negative cue information. Thus, the associated face would be expected to be easier to start 
thinking about when associated with positive or neutral cues. Put another way, it is harder to 
suppress items associated with positive or neutral cues because it is easier to finish processing 
the positive or negative cue information and move on to another task. The use of negative cues 
may make it easier for individuals to continue attending to the cue than to think of the associated 
face because they may have a harder time stopping themselves from thinking about the negative 
cue.  
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4.0  EXPERIMENT 3 
It now appears evident that, to varying degrees, it is possible to forget neutral memories when 
given emotional cues. Still unclear is the importance of valence of the target being suppressed on 
forgetting. If a battered wife can suppress thinking about her abuser upon seeing a belt (an item 
used to hit her), is that because she is thinking of him when he was nice (suppressing a positive 
target) or not doing anything at all (suppressing a neutral target), or is she actually suppressing 
thinking about how he was when he was angry or violent (suppressing a negative target)? What 
if she can only think of him in one emotional state (i.e., only when he is happy, angry, asleep, 
etc.)? 
In order to again expand our understanding of the TNT paradigm, we will now consider 
the effects of the emotional content of the face. Here again we are faced with the possibility that 
there is something inherently different between positive, neutral, and negative target stimuli as 
regards forgetting ability. If we process emotional and unemotional memories similarly, we 
should expect both to show similar patterns of forgetting. If emotional memories are accessed 
differently, however, we must consider the reasons for that differential memory ability. 
Potentially, differences in memory ability could be due to how individuals process information. 
However, those differences may also be due to reasons related to other factors, such as 
differential experience suppressing or motivation. 
Intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting experiments have demonstrated 
that individuals can forget positive, neutral, and negative information, though, as mentioned 
earlier, different researchers tends to equivocate on the effect of valence on forgetting. As 
discussed previously, research has alternately shown that forgetting is easier for positive stimuli 
or negative stimuli (e.g., Amir, et al., 2001; Barnier, et al., 2004; Wessel and Wright, 2004), and 
no meta-analysis has been done at this time to consider differences in those research designs and 
findings.  
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Experiment 3 considers valence of target face, given a neutral cue word. While it is 
relevant to know that emotional cues can have an effect on neutral memories, understanding 
whether we can forget emotional memories allows us to consider other situations of forgetting, 
where the target memory cannot in any way be construed as neutral. In Experiment 2, the target 
faces were neutral while cue words varied by valence. In Experiment 3, the target faces are 
emotional and the cue words are neutral.  
4.1 METHODS 
4.1.1 Participants and design 
Forty-two participants from the Fairfield, CT and Amherst, MA areas volunteered for this 3 (not 
presented, presented once, or presented eight times in phase two) x 2 (rehearsed or suppressed) x 
3 (positive, neutral, or negative face).  
4.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Experiment 3 replicated the procedure in Experiment 2, with the following changes: First, 
participants learned to pair 36 neutral words drawn from the ANEW list (Bradley and Lang, 
1999) and 36 faces (12 positive, 12 negative, and 12 neutral) designed by Faces 3.0. In addition 
to the 36 target faces, there were 36 foils for the final test phase and 36 fillers for the learning 
and TNT phases. The target faces were not used in Experiment 2, but some of the neutral words 
were drawn from Experiment 1. The method of designing the faces was similar to that of 
Experiment 2, with special attention paid to mouths, eyes, and eyebrows. Both targets and foils 
were again equally likely to be male or female and African-American or Caucasian. Targets and 
foils shared similar features, though each face was unique and no feature was used more than 
four times. Those faces were selected as positive (e.g., happy, surprised), neutral (e.g., bored, 
sleepy), or negative (e.g., angry, sad) based on facial expressions. Three independent judges 
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scored each face for valence, with a high overall interrater reliability, W = .829. Finally, in the 
Final Test phase, participants were given a recognition test on 72, instead of 100, faces. 
4.2 RESULTS 
4.2.1 Recognition accuracy: Condition 
An ANOVA considering accuracy of old/new judgments showed significant differences between 
conditions for action during TNT phase and an interaction between TNT phase and number of 
repetitions, F (2, 82) = 70.948, p < .001, and F (2, 82) = 55.312, p < .001, respectively. 
Overall, rehearsed faces were more likely to be correctly identified as “old” than 
suppressed or NRS faces, t (41) = 11.767, p < .001 and t (41) = 9.626, p < .001, respectively. 
While there was no significant main effect for repetitions, p < .10, R1 faces were significantly 
more likely to be recognized as old than S1 faces, t (41) = 5.669, p < .001. Additionally, R8 faces 
were significantly more likely to be accurately judged as old than R1 faces, t (41) = 6.122, p < 
.001, while there was only a trend showing lowered accessibility for S8 faces as compared to S1 
faces, t (41) = 1.776, p = .083. There was no difference between suppressed and NRS faces, t < 
1, p > .10. Thus, when confronted with the word, participants were more likely to forget faces if 
they attempted suppression instead of rehearsal. However, participants were not more likely to 
forget faces when they suppressed those faces when compared with uncued faces. Finally, NRS 
items were significantly more accurately remembered than chance, t (41) = 18.850, p < .001. 
(See Figure 4.) 
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Figure 4. Percent of trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition in 
Experiment 3. 
4.2.2 Recognition accuracy: Valence of response face 
An ANOVA of the effect of the valence of the face on accurate recognition showed a main effect 
for valence, as well as an interaction between valence and condition, F (2, 82) = 7.455, p = .001 
and F (4, 164) = 14.039, p < .001, respectively.  
When considering the effect of valence, participants were less accurate with positive 
faces than with negative faces, t (41) = 4.104, p < .001. The pattern of inhibition changed based 
on the valence of the face. When positive, rehearsed faces were more accurately identified than 
either suppressed or NRS faces, t (41) = 5.579, p < .001 and t (41) = 7.688, p < .001, 
respectively, and suppressed faces were more accurately remembered than NRS faces, t (41) = 
2.279, p = 028. Thus, when reacting to a positive face, rehearsed faces were best recognized, 
followed by suppressed faces, and then NRS faces. Finally, positive NRS items were 
significantly more accurate than chance, t (41) = .120, p > .01. 
When neutral, rehearsed items were more accurately identified than either suppressed or 
NRS faces, t (41) = 8.900, p < .001 and t (41) = 6.058, p < .001, respectively. There was no 
significant difference between suppressed and NRS faces, t < 1, p > .10. Thus, when reacting to a 
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neutral face, rehearsed faces were best recognized, followed equally by NRS and suppressed 
faces. Finally, neutral NRS items were significantly more accurately remembered than chance, t 
(41) = 17.973, p < .001. 
When negative, rehearsed faces were more accurately recognized than either suppressed 
or NRS items, t (41) = 8.207, p < .001 and t (41) = 3.901, p < .001, respectively, and NRS faces 
were more accurately recognized than suppressed faces, t (41) = 3.054, p = .004. Therefore, 
when reacting to a negative face, participants recognized rehearsed faces best, followed by NRS, 
and then suppressed faces. (See Figure 5.) Finally, all NRS items were significantly more 
accurately remembered than chance, no matter the valence (negative: t (41) = 28.830, p < .001; 
neutral: t (41) = 5.818, p < .001; positive: t (41) = 3.236, p < .001 ).  
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Figure 5. Percent trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition and 
valence of face in Experiment 3. 
4.3 DISCUSSION 
The present research has demonstrated a replication of the inhibitory effects previously seen with 
neutral target information (words, shapes, and faces), differentially based on valence of the target 
face. Previous stimuli sets have involved targets that were neutral. In the present experiment, the 
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faces had an emotional quality to them, allowing for us to consider whether trying to suppress a 
target that is positive, neutral, or negative changes the overall ability to suppress. What we find is 
that suppression is still possible, but that valence again mediates the effectiveness of the 
inhibition (this time, the valence of the target). 
The findings from Experiment 3 demonstrate that when the target information is positive, 
suppression appears to increase memory, such that mere exposure is beneficial, compared to no 
exposure at all. This result, while similar to the findings for positive cue information, does not 
fully replicate the original research of Anderson and Green (2001). Whereas Anderson found that 
suppression resulted in memory inhibition, the present research demonstrated that there are 
mitigating factors affecting the ability to forget information through suppression. With neutral 
associated information, mere exposure with the intent to suppress minimizes memory to the point 
of no exposure, not improving memory, but not inhibiting it either. Again, while similar to the 
finding for when the cue was neutral, and slightly closer to the original inhibition finding, this 
result is not an exact replication of Anderson’s overall findings of suppression causing memory 
accuracy below no exposure to cues. Finally, for negative associated responses, the act of 
suppression does indeed cause reduced memory, as measured by less accuracy at recognition 
memory, as compared to rehearsal. Here, as was the case when the cue was negative, we find a 
replication of the research by Anderson and Green’s TNT results.  
I propose two possible explanations for these findings. First, individuals may be 
differentially experienced in suppressing negative and, to a lesser degree, neutral information 
than positive information. This would be the case if we assume that individuals do not suppress 
positive experiences as much as other experiences, and suppress negative experiences the most. 
This seems to be a strong possibility, when we consider the situations in which we expect 
individuals to suppress. Whereas there are times when individuals would try to suppress positive 
or neutral information (such as avoiding thinking of something because it is distracting), there 
are probably far more times when individuals would suppress negative information (such as 
when the information causes emotional pain). Thus, they are becoming more experienced in the 
act of suppression. 
Second, the ability to suppress may vary due to feelings of aversion to the target 
information: Perhaps individuals are more willing to suppress negative thoughts or memories 
because they are specifically motivated by aversion. This could lead individuals to be more 
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likely to either succeed, which speaks to skill, or at least try, which speaks to motivation. The 
skill explanation was discussed earlier. For the motivation explanation, it may be that individuals 
are better at suppressing negative information because they are more motivated to do so. If 
individuals feel an aversion to the information that they are trying to suppress, they may try 
harder to suppress. For positive information, individuals may not be as motivated to suppress, 
and less effort will lead to less success. For negative information, individuals may feel more 
motivated to suppress due to an aversion to the target information. For neutral information, the 
level of aversiveness can vary, though that information will not be extremely negative. 
The finding that suppression increases forgetting rates over baseline only for negative 
target items is important to the real-life applicability of the TNT paradigm. If individuals are 
attempting to avoid thinking about something that is neutral, they will be about as successful as 
if they are not forced into contact with cues to think about the neutral stimuli. Thus, the previous 
inhibitory effects seen by Anderson do not appear to replicate to the same degree in the present 
experiment. Again, however, it is important to consider that Anderson was not always able to 
replicate his own inhibitory effects consistently (Anderson and Green, 2001). These findings can 
be seen as even stronger than the original research. 
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5.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We know that when people suppress information, their memories are less accurate, and in some 
cases, the forgetting caused by suppression increases with additional suppression attempts 
(Anderson and Green, 2001). In contrast, increased rehearsal results in increased accuracy in 
memory. Research with the TNT paradigm has thus far addressed this forgetting only in terms of 
words, and then only with recall tests. 
Our understanding about forgetting either of emotional stimuli or using recognition tests 
is derived from intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting research. Both literatures 
have indicated that emotional information is possible to forget, though they equivocate on 
whether positive or negative information is easier to forget. Intentional forgetting and retrieval-
induced forgetting researchers do agree, however, that suppression does cause forgetting, to 
varying degrees, in recognition tests. 
5.1 CURRENT FINDINGS 
We can think of suppression in two ways.  First, it can cause absolute forgetting, where 
recognition of suppressed items is poorer than that for items that were neither rehearsed nor 
suppressed (NRS items). Second, suppression can cause relative forgetting, where recognition is 
less accurate for suppressed information than for rehearsed information, but greater than that for 
the NRS items. In some situations, forgetting due to suppression was absolute (for instance, 
situations when the cue or target is negative); in all conditions, however, the forgetting was at 
least relative. Each of these situations is discussed below. 
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5.1.1 Recognition memory 
In all three experiments, recognition memory was tested. Each time, participants showed some 
degree of forgetting on a recognition test, a finding similar to previous TNT research using recall 
tests. Overall, the expected forgetting findings (participants had a harder time remembering 
information that they suppressed than information that they did not suppress) were observed in 
each experiment. In addition to observing forgetting in each of the individual experiments, when 
we consider all three experiments together, the data again produce a pattern of absolute 
forgetting due to suppression. (See Figure 6.) While not as readily remembered as when tested 
using a free recall test, the pattern of results remains the same. While this may seem inconsistent 
with previous findings considering recognition and recall tests (that information is easier to 
access using recognition tests), it is important to remember that the present experiments use 
different types of stimuli, nonvervalizable shapes and faces, than Anderson and Green (2001), 
who used words. Additionally, the present stimuli are not easily tested using recall testing. 
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Figure 6. Percent trials accurately recognized as “old” across all three experiments, compared to recall 
memory results from Anderson and Green, 2001. 
 
Recognition tests provide a powerful cue to remember the target. Given that participants 
saw “old” targets in a recognition test and still misidentified those targets as “new” demonstrates 
that, at the very least, participants now have less confidence in their memories. That is, since 
their certainty that they have seen a target is lower if they have suppressed it compared to if they 
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have not suppressed it, participants are less likely to agree that they had seen a target following 
suppression. While this may not mean that participants have completely forgotten the target, it 
does mean that they are less certain that they have seen the target, and may even have the explicit 
memory or belief that they had not previously seen the target. This appears to align the TNT 
paradigm with intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting research. Those literatures 
have also demonstrated that recognition tests are fairly consistent with recall memory tests 
(Anderson, et al., 2000; Hicks and Starns, 2004; Sahakyan, 2004).  
5.1.2 Visual stimuli  
Various types of visual stimuli were used in all three experiments. The first experiment involved 
nonverbalizable shapes. It was important to consider these shapes due to their non-lexical nature. 
While not necessarily as complex as words, nonverbalizable shapes allow for participants to 
focus almost entirely on the visual quality of the stimuli (i.e., considering information from only 
one modality). In addition, the use of shapes allowed for the learning of entirely novel 
information, extending the applicability of the TNT paradigm.  
Experiments 2 and 3 utilized faces. The use of these faces allowed for a better 
understanding of forgetting of more ecologically valid stimuli, as well as more complex and 
engaging stimuli. The everyday significance of data regarding faces is perhaps the most striking 
of all applications, however. There are many situations in which we might imagine a person 
attempting to suppress a face instead of a shape or word. That it is possible to forget faces 
through suppression adds to the credibility of suppression as a viable explanation for forgetting 
in social situations where the target that we are trying to forget is often an individual. 
In Experiment 1, participants demonstrated absolute forgetting when suppressing simple 
visual stimuli. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants demonstrated absolute and relative forgetting 
of faces. While the degree to which forgetting was possible with faces varied, that variance was 
likely not related to the fact that the stimuli were faces. In both Experiments 2 and 3, when data 
were collapsed across valence conditions, the results produced the expected absolute forgetting 
finding predicted by Anderson and Green’s original findings. That people are able to suppress 
visual stimuli extends previous research from intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced 
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forgetting literatures that also seems to demonstrate that the use of visual stimuli is not a 
limitation on the ability to forget through suppression (Ford, et al., 1995; Lehman, et al., 1998).  
Finally, we must also pay attention to the differences in information we can draw from 
forgetting of faces as compared with shapes. Nonverbal shapes are beneficial in that they allow 
for a bridge between previous research (solely lexical stimuli) and the present research (visual 
stimuli). However, that we do not see significant neutral findings for face/word pairs and do for 
shape/word pairs does lead one to consider the possibility that there is something intrinsically 
different about faces and other types of stimuli. Without specifically considering neutral words 
paired with neutral faces, we cannot definitively differentiate the effect of neutral words and 
faces as compared to neutral words and shapes. 
5.1.3 Emotional stimuli  
Experiments 2 and 3 addressed valence of the cues and targets, respectively, when attempting 
suppression. When we average these findings across experiments, the findings again remain the 
same: When either the target or cue was positive, suppression resulted in only relative forgetting. 
When the target or cue was negative, suppression resulted in absolute forgetting. (See Figure 7.) 
Specifically, in Experiment 2, suppression resulted in absolute forgetting of neutral targets for 
negative cues, but relative forgetting from positive and neutral cues. Experiment 3 mirrored these 
results, but with neutral cues and varying the valence of the target.  
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Figure 7. Percent trials accurately identified as “old” on the final test, as a function of condition and 
valence across experiments 2, 3, and Anderson and Green’s neutral cue and target results (2001). 
 
There are a number of ways to consider the relevance of this finding. First, we are more 
likely to have a greater need to suppress negative information as opposed to neutral or positive 
information. This could mean that individuals are better at suppressing negative information 
because it serves as a successful coping mechanism intended for negative information (i.e., 
suppression is naturally designed for negative information). Alternately, this may also mean that 
individuals are more likely to suppress negative stimuli than neutral or positive information, and 
so are better at it because they do it more (i.e., individuals become skilled at suppressing 
negative information due to greater relative use compared to neutral or positive information). 
The directionality of the relationship between suppression success and negative information is 
unclear, but it is conceptually an important one. 
If Anderson and Green (2001) were correct in postulating that the TNT paradigm could 
explain how people forget traumatic experiences, then that could lead us to predict that 
suppression should be especially effective for negative cues and stimuli. Given that traumatic 
experiences are often triggered (relevant to the findings of Experiment 2) by negative cues, and 
traumatic experiences (relevant to the findings of Experiment 3) are, by definition, negative, the 
data that negative cues and responses can be suppressed are consistent with Anderson and 
Green’s expectation. Specifically, the present results demonstrate that suppression will be most 
successful if the cue and target are negative. 
Finally, it may be that we are more biologically more predisposed to successfully 
suppressing negative information, as opposed to positive information. Just as certain associations 
are more easily made than others (e.g., touching something that results in a shock will require 
fewer training sessions than eating something that results in a shock) (Garcia and Koelling, 
1966), so too may certain kinds of information be easier to suppress. If this is the case, we should 
see a similar pattern of negative information being better suppressed than positive information in 
intentional forgetting and retrieval-induced forgetting research as well. While this finding is not 
is not always found, it does appear often enough for us to question if there are specific 
circumstances in which this is likely to be consistently found (e.g., special populations, traumatic 
memories, etc.). 
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5.2 USING THE TNT TO EXPLAIN CURRENT PHENOMENA 
There are a number of ways in which the TNT findings have been used to describe normal 
human memory processing. I will detail below two such situations: continuing social interactions 
with people with whom we have had negative encounters, and the forgetting step of repression. 
5.2.1 Social interactions  
In interpersonal relationships, we can, and often do, choose to exclude information from our 
environments that we know trigger us to think about unwanted memories. After we separate 
from a spouse or lover, we will often remove pictures of that individual from our immediate 
surroundings. Without those cues in our immediate environment, we often find that we are better 
able to cope with and avoid unwanted memories and thoughts. Sometimes, however, it is not 
possible to remove those cues. If we continue to work with a former spouse, for example, it is 
not feasible to remove all cues of that person from our environment. Therefore, when we are not 
able to remove cues, the present research can inform us of those times when suppression is likely 
to be most helpful, in lieu of removal of cues.  
The present research is especially telling for social situations. First, there are situations in 
which suppression will be effective when there is no escaping the cues in one’s environment. In 
those situations, it is not possible to remove cues to think about a target, but forgetting will be 
more successful when one suppresses the target, as opposed to allowing oneself to think about 
the target (relative forgetting, as tested when comparing rehearsed and suppressed targets). 
Additionally, there are specific times when removal of the cues to remember a target (having no 
cues to think about the target, as tested using the NRS condition) is not as effective as intentional 
suppression. When trying to suppress negative thoughts, for instance, the use of suppression 
actually appears to cause fuller forgetting than not presenting the cues to remember at all 
(absolute forgetting). 
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5.2.2 Forgetting step of repression  
The TNT paradigm has evoked considerable excitement and controversy due to speculation that 
it may provide the foundation for a laboratory analogue to the processes associated with the 
forgetting aspects of “repression” (e.g., Conway, 2001; Kihlstrom, 2002; Levy and Anderson, 
2002; Schacter, 2001), although clearly, great caution must be taken in overgeneralizing the 
results of this TNT manipulation. The TNT paradigm produces only modest differences in 
memory for relatively benign stimuli, whereas “repression” may result in the extensive forgetting 
of highly emotional material (e.g., Wilsnack, Wonderlich, Kristjanson, Vogeltanz-Holm, and 
Wilsnack, 2002)4. However, we can begin to consider this issue on a conceptual level. 
In the ongoing debate about the validity of claims of repression, researchers differ in their 
notions regarding how individuals might come to forget and then later remember information. 
Some have claimed that the TNT paradigm offers a new glimpse into how we might suppress 
traumatic information, such that the recollection of that information, as well as the knowledge 
that it was previously unavailable, would lead to reporting the phenomenon as repression 
(Anderson, Ochsner, Kuhl, Cooper, Robertson, Gabrieli, Glover, and Gabrieli, 2004; but cf. 
Kihlstrom, 2002). According to this view, individuals who experience trauma are often 
confronted with cues that stimulate them to think about that trauma. In order to avoid accessing 
those traumatic memories, individuals redirect their thoughts when confronted with cues to avoid 
thinking about the trauma – analogous to the suppression condition of the TNT paradigm.  
The TNT paradigm has been referenced as a potential explanation for how traumatic 
memories might be forgotten. The present research adds to our understanding of that application 
by allowing us to consider the individual variables which might influence the efficacy of the 
forgetting caused by suppression in the TNT paradigm. For instance, if we are to eventually 
begin to draw parallels between the TNT paradigm and reported repressed memories of 
                                                 
4 Indeed, it sometimes seems difficult to believe that consensus will ever be reached regarding whether a 
well-specified laboratory phenomenon might provide a foundation for a construct that is so ambiguously defined and 
inconsistently used as “repression” (Schooler, et al., 1996). Notably, the term repression is at times used to denote 
the phenomenon of total forgetting of traumatic material (e.g. Ofshe and Singer, 1994), at other times to describe an 
entirely non-conscious psychodynamic mechanism (e.g., Conway, 2001), and at still other times to refer to a more 
deliberate suppression mechanism (e.g., Erdelyi, 2001). 
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traumatic experiences, it is important for us to know that the forgetting observed in the TNT 
paradigm is driven by negative stimuli. Indeed, were it not relevant for negative stimuli, it would 
be difficult to draw a parallel between the laboratory procedure of the TNT paradigm and real 
world forgetting situations. Similarly, to know that the procedure is not limited to word forms 
allows us the freedom to continue to explore the outer limitations of the forgetting of the TNT 
paradigm and how it can speak to forgetting in everyday life. 
5.3 POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE TNT PARADIGM 
There are a number of clinical applications for this research. For example, cues triggering 
flashbacks are a hallmark of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). With PTSD, it is often a 
seemingly neutral cue that causes individuals to remember a negative memory. Though not as 
dramatic as PTSD, people experiencing specific phobias will remember negative memories in 
response to often innocuous cues.  
The present research offers insights into situations in which it might be beneficial to 
engage in suppression. In the course of coping with PTSD and phobias, this research may allow a 
better understanding of applying suppression to aid in the elimination of negative responses to 
cues. Perhaps in combination with other behavioral or physiological therapies, the present 
research may become a part of a successful clinical treatment to overcome emotional cues or 
avoid emotional target thoughts and memories. The insight from this research informs us as to 
situations in which suppression might be most successful. 
5.4 RESEARCH EXTENSIONS  
The original impetus for the TNT paradigm was to better understand the phenomenon of 
people reporting that they experienced events for which they previously had no memory. An 
example of one such event might be a recovered memory of abuse. While this paradigm does not 
demonstrate that people can later come to remember information that they did not have access to 
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(suppression recovery), it is a first step in demonstrating that it is possible, through ordinary 
memory processes, to intentionally suppress an event that one may want to forget.  
One next logical step, then, is to consider the circumstances under which it might be 
possible to recover forgotten suppressed information after long delays. Various methods could be 
employed to accomplish this. One way could be to reteach all of the information, as well as new 
information, and compare the learning curve for each. If there is still an effect of the previously 
learned information, we should expect the learning curve for the old information to be faster than 
for the new information, as well as faster than for its own initial learning curve. 
Another method might be to tell participants that they did formerly learn information, and 
then ask them how much of that information they remember. In this research, we could compare 
reported memory for four types of information: information that participants did not learn but are 
told that they did learn (information that is new but they are mislead to think is old), information 
that participants did learn and are told that they did not learn (information, both rehearsed and 
suppressed, that is old and participants are mislead to believe is new), information that 
participants did not learn and are not told that they did learn (information that participants are not 
mislead to believe is new), and information that participants did learn and are not told that they 
did learn (information, both rehearsed and suppressed, that is old and that participants are not 
mislead to believe is new). If there are vestiges of the old information still lingering, there should 
be at least a heightened feeling of familiarity of the old information, whereas there might be less 
familiarity with new information that participants are told they already knew.  
With the present research, there was no personal connection between the stimuli and the 
participant. That is, the shapes and faces shown were not images that participants knew or had 
any reason to suppress. In that lack of personal relationship to the stimuli, we are forced to 
generalize about how people will respond to the stimuli, but not necessarily self-relevant stimuli. 
In the future, it would be important to consider the effect of a personal connection to the stimuli 
in terms of a person’s ability to suppress. If one is not able to suppress self-relevant information, 
then the TNT paradigm has limited effectiveness in terms of explaining how people might exert 
voluntary control over their thoughts and memories.  
Another point to consider is that, in real life situations, it is often the case that both the 
cues and targets are emotional. In the experiments described here, the cues or targets could be 
emotional, but never both. If we include trials where both the cue and the target are emotional 
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stimuli, we should be more accurate in reflecting real situations that people face when attempting 
to suppress information. Doing so would add to the credibility of the theory underlying the TNT 
paradigm: that short-term intentional suppression can reduce memory in situations in which 
people would want to limit accessibility. Additionally, it would be interesting to consider the 
effect of varying the valence of both the cue and the target, both to look for an interaction and to 
see which is more powerful in driving the forgetting effects. Said another way, which is more 
important: the valence of the cue or the valence of the target? 
Finally, it will be important to consider the effect of arousal on memory. If a stimulus cue 
or item to-be-remembered is highly arousing, it may be that it will have a negative effect on the 
ability to inhibit. On the other hand, if people are more skilled in suppressing highly arousing 
information, they may be better at suppressing arousing information than unarousing 
information.  
5.5 FINAL THOUGHTS 
The TNT paradigm is more generally applicable to situations outside of word list learning 
tasks, and is very useful for informing us about the importance of valence of cues and memories, 
and how they affect performance. All of this supports our use of the TNT paradigm for 
understanding a powerful phenomenon: forgetting due to intentional suppression within a normal 
memory context. This research illustrates that forgetting of emotional information is not 
necessarily something that is untestable, relying on concepts we have yet to reliably define, much 
less empirically assess. In addition, were the TNT paradigm to be developed further, it may 
allow us the opportunity to improve an individual’s coping skills, and help them overcome 
symptoms associated with affectively negative memories. 
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